Publication | Page 645 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

This article covers the problems of religious identities in two Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – and analyses how globalisation and modernisation influenced them. International relations theories as well the sociology of religion presume that religious identity in contemporary Central Asia cannot be exclusively seen as a local product; it is of a twodimensional character and reflects both local and broad external influences. The article argues that while external dimensions are noteworthy, local developments and modernisation need elaboration. The differences in local developments and modernisation during the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods are derived from the basic difference between Kazakh and Uzbek societies as nomadic and settled ones that had various degrees of religious beliefs; more profound among the Uzbeks and less among the Kazak.

In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.

When the Kargil Committee wrote to Rao that they would like to meet him, he asked me to meet him alone. He was President of IDSA from 1980 to 1987 when I was its Director. We had, therefore, known each other over a period of years. In the meeting, taking advantage of Rao’s offer to discuss on the nuclear issue on a one-to-one basis, I asked him why he called off the nuclear test of December 1995. He said there was no consensus on the test. There were divisions not only among the economists and administrators but also among the scientists themselves. He felt that he would conduct the test if he came back to office.

I asked him whether he did not owe it to the country and future generations to give his account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office. I also reminded him while I was not at the centre of decision-making on the nuclear issue I had been on the periphery of it. He said he was aware of it and would be prepared to talk to me in my individual capacity but not to the Kargil Committee. When I pressed him further on his obligations to future generations, he said he had an obligation only to one person and he had discharged it to the full. When I asked him who that person was, he replied “Atalji who succeeded me. I have briefed him fully.” It is obvious from his statement that he had told Atalji all he had to know.

The Kargil Committee (George Verghese) also asked him why the defence budget was cut during his time. Rao replied that was because the nuclear deterrent was under development and that had priority. Then he proceeded to tell us on his own, how the nuclear arsenal was operationalised only during his premiership. Subsequently, a record of discussion, including what he told us on the progress of the nuclear programme during his tenure, was sent to him, as was done in all other cases. I was wondering whether on second thoughts, he would cut out the portion on the nuclear issue. He did not, but signed the record as it was and returned it. One could understand why the NDA had an interest in not publishing the annexures of the Kargil report since the Rao account would have appropriated most of the credit for nuclear weapon development to the Congress. The publication of the annexures at this stage would be to the advantage of the UPA.

Perhaps it was fortunate that the tests got postponed by two years. That gave enough time for Dr Chidambaram to finalise his design of the thermo-nuclear device that was tested in May 1998. Some people have attributed Vajpayee’s determination to conduct the test to Brajesh Mishra’s urging. That raises the question how Vajpayee attempted to conduct the test during his 13-day tenure of office when Mishra was not around. Vajpayee’s present disclosure would tend to support the view that he was egged on at that time by Rao.

Rao would not have acted without cold calculation. In 1994 concerned with the apparent lack of progress on the weapons programme, I gave Brajesh Mishra a draft resolution for the BJP to move in Parliament that the Government of India would continue with its preparations for nuclear weapon capability and would never sign the NPT. A little later, Mishra informed me that when Vajpayee showed the resolution to Rao the latter assured him that the programme was on track and there was no need for such a resolution.

In 1985, Dr Ramanna, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and myself as Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, both members of Rajiv Gandhi’s interdisciplinary group drafted two proposals to be presented to Pakistan – one on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and two, a mutual pledge not to attack each other’s nuclear installations. Rajiv Gandhi favoured both proposals. At that stage, Rao was the Defence Minister. He summoned Dr Ramanna, Dr Arunachalam and me and discussed the proposals. That was the first time I came to realise that Rao was among the few in the decision-making loop on nuclear weapons. He told us that while he was in favour of our proposals in principle, he was against initiating the no-first-use proposal at that stage. His reason: the Prime Minister had done so much of talking on Pakistani nuclear weapons that our offers would lead the Pakistanis to conclude that India was initiating them out of a sense of weakness and fear. Rajiv accepted this logic. So while the proposal on mutual non-attack on each other’s nuclear installations was pursued by Rajiv Gandhi, the no-first-use proposal was dropped for the time being.

In 1994, January, J.N. Dixit was laying down office as Foreign Secretary. He called me up on telephone and told me that he had come back from Pakistan where he presented to the Pakistanis six non-papers. One of them was on an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear capabilities. He said he had carried out what I had been urging for years.

In 1985 I proposed to Rao, then Defence Minister, that our armed forces needed to be educated further on nuclear strategy. My own knowledge of nuclear strategy and my visits to the National Defence College and Wellington Staff College led me to believe that the expertise of our armed forces on nuclear strategy and doctrines should be advanced further. So I suggested that Lt. General Sundarji, then Vice Chief of Army Staff should be requested to prepare an instruction programme on the subject. Again Rao told me ‘not yet’. Sundarji and myself attributed this reluctance to Rao’s then widely believed tendency to avoid decisions. But during my private conversation with Rao during the Kargil hearings, I realised, as a cautious man he was not perhaps willing to launch any step which would tell the world that India had weapons till they were fully ready. His complaint was that till he took over as PM, the Indian weapon effort was not at optimum speed; a complaint that I am in no position to confirm or deny. According to Rao, he bought time till the country was ready and then attempted to go for testing.

I am recording the last two conversations Rao had with me during the Kargil enquiry because of their relevance to history.

Though the credit for the order to assemble the weapon goes to Rajiv Gandhi and the credit for restarting the development programme of the weapon after Morarji Desai halted it belongs to Indira Gandhi, it was Narasimha Rao who operationalised it. In other words, there has been a consistent continuity in the Indian nuclear policy under Congress governments. Even while working hard for nuclear disarmament, Congress prime ministers were hardheaded people who did not put all their eggs only in the basket of nuclear disarmament. During the time when Rao was Prime Minister, when India was under considerable pressure from the US to roll back its nuclear programme, he appears to have kept Vajpayee informed of the progress in the nuclear programme.

The evidence of this is that there was no pressure from the BJP in Parliament on the nuclear issue though there was a widespread impression in the country that the programmes had been slowed down under US pressure. Unfortunately, Rao’s statesmanship in treating the nuclear issue as a nonpartisan national issue did not appear to have been reciprocated by the NDA leadership on the day of the Shakti tests.

The present UPA government in which the Congress party plays the dominant role must prepare a white paper on the evolution of India’s nuclear policy so that there will be necessary continuity in the documentation of the country’s security and foreign policy. This has been advocated by the Kargil Committee.

President Bush has announced Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary of State in his second term. Her deputy at the National Security Council, Stephen Hadley, has been named as the new National Security Advisor. These two along with John R. Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs who serves as Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, represent the right wing of the foreign policy establishment. The Rice and Hadley appointments suggest that the President’s effort is to fill crucial cabinet positions with people who ‘know his mind’, thus intending to extend his personal control over agencies he has suspected of impeding his foreign policy aims during his first term in office.

Announcing the first two appointments on November 16, 2004, President Bush confirmed that Rice would be taking office at a critical time when “we are a nation at war”, indicating a certain nuance of the time period. Bush’s second term is expected to be dogged by foreign policy challenges like the ‘war against terrorism’, war in Iraq, threats emanating from Iran and North Korea (proliferation issue), and the fractured trans-Atlantic relationship left over from his first term in office.

Bush’s New Team

Colin Powell’s resignation has removed a moderate voice from the top ranks of the administration. It is feared that this might signal a future ‘aggressive’ foreign policy. In an interview with the Financial Times after the elections Powell had stated that “the President is not going to trim his sails or pull back”, meaning that it was unlikely that the Bush, in his second term, would want to alter, amend or curtail his earlier policies.1 The ‘doomsayers’, believe that Bush’s second term “is likely to produce military intervention overseas, along the lines of Iraq in 2003” and the ‘skeptics’, argue that the second presidential term “will turn out to be more cautious and less belligerent.”2

It seems that Rice, given her strong personal ties with President Bush, will speak directly for him and can take decisions in his name, something that ‘Powell could never do’. She is closer to the President than any Secretary of State since Henry A. Kissinger who served Richard Nixon. Colin Powell’s departure underlines the fact that in his second term, the President is seeking White House influence in the State Department since there is a history of both going different ways. With Rice as the new Secretary of State reflecting ‘America’s face to the world’, the only real counterforce, in the persona of Colin Powell has disappeared. Clearly the Neoconservatives believe that Bush’s second term victory confirms the essential righteousness of their global agenda, beginning with its decision to invade Iraq as part of the ‘war on terrorism’.3

The other most important office has gone to Hadley, who is said to be close to Dick Cheney. John R. Bolton is another Cheney loyalist though it is not clear at time of writing this comment about the office he will assume. The second term’s top ranks seem to be strengthening the hard-line coalition of aggressive nationalists, neo-conservatives and Christian Right that dominated policy-making post-9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon.

Major Issues

This section delves into four major areas of US concern and the probable position on each in the next four years of Bush presidency.

War against Terrorism

After the 9/11 attacks, Washington launched the ‘war on terror’ which began with the Al Qaida, but “it does not end there” as Bush proclaimed, adding with conviction that “it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”4 Although no terror attack has occurred in the US since 9/11, Osama bin Laden, the prime accused continues to remain elusive. Pakistan, the perpetrator of terrorism, as brought out by the 9/11 Commission Report (“Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after 9/11, although it was harbouring bin Laden”)5 and the US are trying to further strengthen mutual ties. This ‘engagement’ of Pakistan is a continuation of President Bush’s earlier policy towards its ‘frontline state’. While the highlights of the first term with respect to Pakistan was the famous Camp David visit of President Musharraf (June 2003), the major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status granted to Islamabad (June 2004); the beginning of the second term witnesses the US Congress approving a $300 million military aid package for Pakistan (November 2004). This was the biggest military aid package to Pakistan since 9/11. Given their loyalty to President Bush, the new set of officials ‘who know his mind’ (emphasis added) will give their full cooperation to Washington’s ‘global war against terrorism’.

Middle East

It is expected that the main foreign policy focus in the second term is likely to be the Middle East. The unilateral strike against Iraq in 2003 had set the stage for the administration’s future involvement with the region. The war against Saddam has been in keeping with the policy stand of the neocons dominating the Bush administration during the first term. Rice is criticised for what appeared to be her failures either to warn the President about flawed pre-war intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons programmes or having made less than consistent efforts to ascertain its accuracy.6 In one of her several statements supporting the ‘unilateral war’ against Iraq, she had commented in September 2003 that high strength aluminium tubes seized en route to Iraq were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programmes,” though almost a year earlier, her staff had been told that the nation’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were intended for nuclear weapons.

Being an administration loyalist, Hadley, from the very beginning has supported Washington’s unilateral action against Iraq. He validated the fact that Iraq was in possession of nuclear weapons and had links with the Al Qaida even when the CIA repeatedly pointed out that such a fact was not supported by hard evidence.7

Proliferation/Security

As the world’s strongest nuclear and conventional power, the US intends to freeze weapons development and halt nuclear proliferation. In its quest for ‘absolute national security’, a US $401.7 billion budget proposal for defence in 2005 is underway. In the meantime, Iran and North Korea are being identified as two major challenges to the administration. Both have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations and their unwillingness to respond to repeated calls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The hawks in the regime are building a case of ominous disclosures about Iran’s nuclear capabilities to make the case that Iran is a threat that must be confronted, either by economic sanctions, military action, or “regime change.” Leading the charge for a tough line on Iran has been Bolton.8 Rice seems to be in a dilemma regarding plan of action against Iran. She is willing to try diplomacy, not certain that it will work and ready to look at other possibilities if it does not.9

In order to deal with North Korea, the Bush Administration established the sixparty talks (August 2003) involving the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme. China has the maximum influence over North Korea since it is its largest aid donor and most powerful neighbour. Hence, it is observed that China, a country often seen as an adversary by the US, has leveraged itself into being a significant player in non-proliferation concerns, an indication that the US’ power to contain proliferation single-handedly is waning. In the case of North Korea, the Bush team may not press for a ‘hardline’ since US troops are stationed in South Korea. It is a possibility that Washington will resort to diplomacy in this case also because of the China factor.

As far as US security is concerned, the doctrine of pre-emption is much debated about in policy circles. Rice is one of the central architects of the controversial Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive strike against states thought to be a threat to the US.10 Hadley participated in the National Institute for Public Policy’s study team that produced Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, a study that called for the development of “mini”-nuclear weapons and served as a road map for Bush’s Nuclear Posture Review. Prefiguring the preventive national security doctrine of the Bush administration, the report stated: “Under certain circ*mstances, very severe nuclear threats may be needed to deter any of these potential adversaries.”11 Bolton is also a staunch advocate of the revival of ‘star wars’ missile defense system and considers the ‘CTBT dead’ after the Senate voted not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 12

Trans-Atlantic Relations

Since trans-Atlantic relations already seem fractured over the Iraq issue, probably a Kerry win could have revived the relationship. However, that does not mean that the current administration will further accentuate the divide. A day after winning the elections President Bush in a press briefing on November 4, 2004, emphasised his determination to reach out to a wider audience. His statement reveals his intention to work with ‘friends and allies’ over the next four years. After all, a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic relation to advance common interests and advance global challenges is in the interest of Washington. As long as Europe does not pose as a counterweight to the US, a united Europe can function as Washington’s partner in the global arena.13

It is only but evident that the Bush loyalists will prefer to harp on the same policy direction as their leader. The team would never want it ‘to go alone’ where it can gain the support of allies since ‘greater the cooperation’ will ensure ‘greater chances of limiting other problems across the Atlantic’.

Conclusion

The change of guard in the State Department probably indicates the emergence of a different cabinet, a ‘true kitchen cabinet’. Condoleezza Rice along with Stephen Hadley and John Bolton led by President Bush may steer a foreign policy direction different from the first term. The second term faces challenges from Iran, North Korea apart from Iraq, which is basically a legacy inherited from the earlier term. Whether Iran or North Korea, it seems that the new team backed by the ‘hardliners’ may press for a ‘coercive’ policy towards the other two ‘axis of evil’ States. The other pressing agenda of the second term may be a stronger, more effective proliferation policy. The new team-mates seem to be strong advocates of Washington’s pursuance of NMD, revival of ‘star wars’ and development of ‘mini’ nukes.

As far as US’ policy towards India is concerned, no major overhaul may be expected, though many analysts are of the belief that Indo-US relations will further improve with Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary of State. The trajectory of future US foreign policy direction will reveal the strategic orientation of the new Bush administration comprising of the President himself along with his distinguished team-mates.

References/End Notes

• 1. “US to Remain ‘Aggressive Abroad”. BBC News, November 9, 2004
• 2. Lobe, Jim, “Springtime for Spooks” at http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26221
• 3. Lobe, Jim, “US Election: New Bush Foreign Policy Posture Unlikely”, IPS News Agency. November 5, 2004 at http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp/idnews=26152
• 4. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/200/09/2001 0920-8.html, September 20, 2001.
• 5. The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Executive Summary. 2004. p.7.
• 6. Purdum, S. Todd, “From Behind the Scenes, Rice on Stage”, The New York Times. November 16, 2004.
• 7. Stephen J. Hadley, 19.11.2004 at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/hadley/hadley.php
• 8. Weisman, R. Steven, “Bush Confronts New Challenge on Issue of Iran”, New York Times, November 19, 2004 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/international/middleeast/ 19diplo.html?oref=login&th=&pagewanted=print&position=
• 9. Ibid.
• 10. Supporting pre-emptive strike against Iraq, Rice had stated that ‘we do not have to sit and wait for mushroom cloud’, indicating that US must deal with threats before they hurt the American people, a concern demonstrated by President Bush several times. For details refer to Blix, Hans, Disarming Iraq. p. 148.
• 11. Stephen J. Hadley, 19.11.2004 at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/hadley/hadley.php
• 12. John R. Bolton at http://www.fpif.org/republicanrule/officials_body.html#bolton. November 24, 2004.
• 13. Bereuter, Doug, Lis, John, “Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship”, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04, p. 150.

Yasser Arafat’s death on November 11, 2004, sparked off apprehensions regarding consequent political turmoil, civil war, increase in violence, confusion over future leadership and a subsequent state of chaos and anarchy in Palestine. However, to the surprise of the Israeli and international media, these perceptions were rebutted by the formation of a unified leadership1 and participation of a majority of Palestinian factions, working collectively, though cautiously, towards the presidential election scheduled for January 9, 2005.

As was expected Mahmoud Abbas, popularly known as Abu Mazen, won comfortably by getting 62.3 per cent of the votes in the election that was relatively free and fair. Abbas, a moderate leader, also heads the dominant political faction Fatah2 and faces an internal dilemma - of establishing a Palestinian democracy by taking the first and most important step of curbing extremist activities of militant factions. There are, nonetheless, certain discrepancies and deeper problems embedded in this fractured political system, which have to be tackled solely by the Palestinians in order to achieve their ultimate goal of a Palestinian State.

Arafat and the Palestinian cause: Till death not do us part

The Palestinians are still trying to overcome the shock of the demise of Yasser Arafat, the symbol of Palestinian nationalism and struggle. Greatly revered by all Palestinians, irrespective of their party or political affiliations, Arafat carried enough weight to influence grassroots opinion. Despite Israeli and American efforts to sideline Arafat, his struggle towards achievement of a Palestinian state was held in high esteem by the Palestinians, especially for bringing their cause to the forefront of international politics. It was, however, the 1987 intifada (uprising) in the West Bank that brought Arafat back from political hibernation and eventually in 1994 he became the head of the newly constituted Palestinian Authority (PA). Arafat subsequently installed most of his contemporaries, who were in exile in Tunis (known as ‘Tunisians’), in major posts in the PA.

As the ‘sole’ leader of Palestine, Arafat before his death wore four different hats: he was the elected President (al-ra’is) of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the head of the interim government on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)3; and head of the Fatah, which represents the mainstream Palestinian national movement and is the major faction within the PLO. However, in recent past, Arafat had come under attack and scrutiny by the Palestinians on charges of corruption, nepotism, cronyism, autocracy and repression. His mode of working included concentration of all power and authority in his hands, and he was known for keeping even close confidantes and co-party members on a short leash. This is also evident by the fact that he did not groom or encourage any co-party member to succeed him. Consequently, Arafat was politically ostracised by the Israelis and Americans, who refused to accept him as a leader and negotiating partner.

Mahmoud Abbas’ election campaign and eventual victory was ironically emblematic of the ‘godfather’ legacy that Arafat left behind. Differing views between them particularly over the use of violence and deep schisms in perceptions and political vision led Abbas to resign from the Prime Minister’s post in September 2003. However, Abbas had to use Arafat’s symbolism during his campaign in order to appease the Palestinian populace for votes.

Palestinian politics has, as a result, not been devoid of contradictions, confusion and political chaos. This was very apparent following Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s announcement of the disengagement plan (February 2004), which saw various Palestinian factions grappling for a future share in power. July 2004 also witnessed a violent power struggle in the Gaza between the ‘old guard’4of the PA led by Arafat and his coterie and a younger generation of militiamen5, disillusioned and upset by the corruption rampant in the PA. The run up to the elections underscored these divisions and portrayed an agitated atmosphere of heightened emotions, unstable political conditions, sporadic security lapses and an alarming anxiety amongst the Palestinians over the Israeli and American roles in shaping their future.

Arafat’s era, nonetheless, witnessed certain continuity, consistency and predictability in Palestine, as well as in its relations with Israel. Paradoxically, this created an atmosphere of impasse characterised by violent acts by Hamas and other militant groups on the one hand, and military operations by Israel on the other. The American role in stimulating the peace process came to naught as both the Israelis and the Palestinians failed to curb violence. Arafat’s death led to the reopening of the peace process and the promise of establishing a Palestinian state by the end of 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas: The Lone Crusader?

Mahmoud Abbas, after taking over the mantle of the President of the PA, faces numerous challenges, most of which have been the main cause of contention between Israel and Palestine: the implementation of the Road Map (2003)6, the possibility of a Palestinian state, Israel’s commitments on the disengagement plan, role of the Hamas and other groups, internal stability and curbing of violence.

Abbas, a ‘Tunisian’ is regarded as a pragmatist and an outspoken critic of violence (especially against the ‘armed’ aspect of the intifada) and was a key architect of the Oslo Accords. He has reiterated the key positions of Arafat, such as the formation of an independent Palestinian state, right of return of the refugees, the status of East Jerusalem, Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza and the West Bank, discontinuing the construction of the Israeli wall and redrawing of boundaries according to the pre-1967 border.

He is well liked by the Americans and is supported by the Arab states. He seems, therefore, to be in a politically comfortable position to negotiate with the Israelis. At the same time, Israel too has demonstrated a willingness to conduct a dialogue with him. For a change, the circ*mstances are quite conducive for a negotiated settlement, and the onus is on Mahmoud Abbas to devise a strategy for working out the best deal for the Palestinians. In all likelihood, he will try to strike a balance between internal compulsions and external pressures.

Internal challenges, like restructuring the security services7 and curtailing their unlawful activities, will definitely demand a stringent approach. To gather all these incongruous elements under the umbrella of an organised political structure, Abbas will need unprecedented support and require major compromises from the Palestinians, to accomplish the eventual goal of establishing a truly independent Palestinian state. But his immediate task will be to address concrete matters related to internal development and stabilisation of the Palestinian society.8 In addition, he will undoubtedly face opposition within the Fatah, particularly from Arafat’s ‘Tunisian’ co-party members who are unlikely to relinquish hold on their currently held powerful positions.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad: Compelled Participants

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the main militant groups operating in Palestinian territories, boycotted the presidential elections, while at the same time calling for evolving a mechanism of ‘joint’ leadership in which they could play a part. Hamas is an extremely popular Islamist movement, which operates through its distinct, yet interlocked, political and military wings. An arch adversary of Israel, its leaders have been repeatedly targeted by the Israeli forces, whose sole aim has been to decapitate the group.9 However, its resilience and capability to recuperate simply reinforces Israeli fears that Hamas will continue to attack Israeli civilians, irrespective of any talks of truce and ceasefire.

Hamas is divided over the issue of a speculated ceasefire between its leaders in the West Bank and Gaza. Since the peace that is on offer is perceived by them as an attempt at consolidating Israeli control over the territories by other means rather than a genuine peace deal, they are, therefore, of the firm opinion that Israel will not voluntarily dismantle the settlements, share their control over Jerusalem, give up the water resources it now controls or agree to lift the economic restrictions that currently constrain Palestinian trade with third countries. Instead, Hamas believes that Israel will prevaricate while using the PA as a substitute security force.10

However, Hamas’ participation in the Municipal Elections on December 23, 2004 has obligated them to enter into the political process. Mahmoud Abbas will have to work arduously towards a ceasefire with the militant elements by either reaching an agreement with them or by combating them. The former approach seems to be more practical for achieving political cooperation and sharing power between Hamas and the PA. Thus, continuous attack on Israeli civilians will only weaken Hamas’ political legitimacy and undermine its role in the future.

Conclusion

Many view Mahmoud Abbas’ victory with cautious optimism. But a majority on both sides does envisage the onset of a peace process, however slow it might be, rather than regression. However, a long-term peace process would require both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to compromise in order to settle the complex issues that confront them. Israel will be expected to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, more or less, dismantle the settlements, re-route the fence, give up East Jerusalem, and finally come to an agreement over the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Abbas, on the other hand, will have to take responsibility to curb violent extremist factions, outline a ceasefire and restructure the internal state of affairs. Both Sharon and Abbas are confronted with extremist elements - Israeli right-wingers and settlers, and Palestinian fundamentalist and Islamic radicals - who act as a stumbling block to peaceful resolution.

Sharon who had previously avoided any negotiation with Arafat appears more inclined to hold talks now with a ‘legitimate’ partner in power. A unified leadership for the Palestinians, however, would imply calling an end to all militant and ‘terrorist’ acts, stronger ties with the US and meeting the Israeli and American demands. Mahmoud Abbas will have to couple pragmatism and moderation with strength and perseverance to sketch out a more stable and less chaotic future for the Palestinians – an elusive future which the Palestinians have been yearning for without much success.

However, the role of potential external actors like the US has wider agendas, than just pushing for elections or establishing democracy in the occupied territories. Elections, according to Bush Jr. would help in the formation of a Palestinian state in a more peaceful and prescribed manner. Nevertheless, a focus on the Middle-East peace process would help him in shifting attention from Iraq for a while, demonstrate his capability to usher in democracy (atleast in one part of the region) and gain more influence in Palestinian internal politics. However, the Bush regime has to re-order its priorities; concentrate on the internal stability in Palestine and assist in shaping an atmosphere conducive for talks between Sharon and Abbas.

Winning the elections was an easier task for Mahmoud Abbas as compared to dealing with the ground realities in the post-election period. What would be challenging for him are the politico-security issues that require immediate attention. The next few months will indeed be a testing time for the Palestinians – outlining the contours of their future from the little they are offered and the little they might finally get.

References/End Notes

• 1. On November 11, former Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas became the new Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), while Parliament Speaker Rawih Fattouh emerged as the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Under the Palestinian basic law, he can hold office for 60 days during which time elections should be held. Farouk Kaddoumi, the Tunis based chief of PLO’s political department, is the new head of the Fatah. See “Polls in Palestine”, The Hindu, New Delhi. November 19, 2004.
• 2. Fatah represents the mainstream Palestinian national movement and is the major and dominant faction within the PLO.
• 3. The PLO was formed in 1964 as an umbrella organisation dedicated for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In 1968, Arafat became the chairman of the PLO.
• 4. This “old guard” or the Tunis gang comprises of the majority of Arafat’s compatriots who returned with him to the West Bank in 1994.
• 5. Members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the armed wing associated with the Fatah was responsible for spearheading violence for reformation in the PA.
• 6. The most recent proposal of peace was in the form of the Roadmap, which was launched in June 2003 by the quartet comprising of U.S., Russia, United Nations, and the European Union. It is a goal driven, phase-by-phase route to bring about a solution between Israel and Palestine in two years.
• 7. These security forces, all a part of the Fatah, broke away and started functioning as armed groups. Their modus operandi resulted in violent infighting and criminal activities.
• 8. Reform, security for the citizens, growing poverty, unemployment, tackling corruption within the PA, streamlining the disorganized security services and overall development of the Palestinian society.
• 9. The killing of Sheikh Yassin in March 2004 and Abd al-Aziz Rantissi in April 2004 was a clear sign.
• 10. Gunning, Jeroen, “Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation”, International Affairs 80, 2, 2004, p. 233.

On November 19, 2004, the UN Security Council convened an unusual session on Sudan’s doorstep, in Nairobi at the end of which they unanimously adopted a resolution promising political and economic support once Sudan ended the 21-yearold war that has left millions dead in that country. The Council secured a written pledge from the Sudanese Government and the rebel People’s Liberation Movement that they would complete a final accord by December 31, 2004. Council members said that the promise of a comprehensive peace deal in southern Sudan offered the best hope for not only resolving the longest running civil war in the country but also for providing the political basis for the resolution of other conflicts, including the Darfur conflict.

The resolution 1574 signalled a change in Sudan policy. The following have been observed:

Unlike the earlier two resolutions (1556 and 1564), which condemned atrocities in the Western province of Darfur, this resolution has put the north-south peace process in southern Sudan as the prime agenda. The Security Council waved a carrot at the government, pledging international aid if it reaches a peace deal with the southern rebels. But regarding Darfur, where the government has been accused of unleashing armed militia on the people, Council members had a hard time coming up with a stick.

The Council has retreated from its previous stance to hold the Sudanese Government accountable for the ongoing human rights abuses. While the new resolution recalls prior Security Council resolutions passed in July and September 2004, it leaves out the explicit demand in those resolutions for Khartoum to disarm and prosecute the government-backed Janjaweed militias.

Resolution 1574 omits language in Resolutions 1556 and 1564 that specifically threatened “further measures”, including the possibility of sanctions. Instead, it includes a much milder warning to “take appropriate action against any party failing to fulfill its commitments.”

Clearly, the Security Council has moved from a strategy of coercive measures to offers of financial inducements. By emphasising upon the southern peace process, it sends a signal that the humanitarian crisis in Darfur can be tolerated. Although over the past two decades, the southern conflict has resulted in two million deaths and four million displacements, it is now in abeyance; in contrast, the Darfur conflict, pitting the government against two rebel groups, has been spinning out of control, causing malnutrition, disease and violence that are claiming thousands of lives each month.

Darfur in the Shadow of North-South Peace

Currently, the Khartoum government has not shown any inclination to resolve the Darfur crisis. Its priority has changed to the north–south peace process. It has sought to use its participation in the peace talks with the southern rebels to avoid reproach over Darfur. The government’s main negotiator, Ali Osman Taha, even threatened not to come to Nairobi if the Security Council put too much emphasis on the violence and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The latest unanimous resolution by the Security Council marks an extraordinary triumph for the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum, as it puts the southern peace effort on the main agenda and demotes the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. The Security Council argues that the resolution may bring about peace in the south, which will in turn improve peace prospects in Darfur. The power-sharing formula will be extended to all parts of the country, assuaging the grievances of rebels in Darfur, whose violence provoked the government’s genocidal response. But the question is, can the Darfur people wait?

Present Insecurity in Darfur

Violence in Darfur is on the increase. According to an African Union spokesman, the number of ceasefire violations has been on the rise in recent months, with 13 cases confirmed in September 2004 and 54 documented between October and mid- December. The UN Integrated Regional Information Network has recently reported that despite the regime’s pledge at Abuja to “refrain from conducting hostile military flights in and over the Darfur region” (Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur, Abuja, November 9, 2004), Khartoum has been conducting aerial military assaults. Both sides have utter disregard for the ceasefire.

Meanwhile, conditions in Darfur remain dire. As per the latest UN assessment, government attacks on civilians continue. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has said that reports of violence against women and children in and around camps in Darfur appear to be on the increase. The death toll is said to exceed 70,000 and tens of thousands are dying of malnutrition and disease. As many as two-and-half million people have been displaced and three million people are now conflict-affected and in need of humanitarian assistance. Western aid workers are being blocked from helping civilians, with the head of Oxfam International’s Sudan operations recently being expelled from the country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had to temporarily withdraw some key international staff from strife-torn south Darfur because Sudanese authorities prevented them from carrying out vital protection work on behalf of thousands of internally displaced people. Moreover due to the ongoing fighting and consequent insecurity, humanitarian efforts are beginning to falter. The humanitarian agency, Save the Children, recently said that its staff had been forced to flee the town of Tawilla, when fighting broke out between government forces and rebels, despite an existing ceasefire agreement.

The situation in Darfur has become life-threatening not only for displaced persons in the camps and in rural areas, but also for humanitarian personnel and operations. Insecurity coupled with threat of drought has made survival of the people in the camps and the villages increasingly tenuous. The families that have been driven from their villages have no means at their disposal. They depend on food aid that is hostage to the budgetary whims of the western governments and restrictions on aid workers’ access. Most of the rural communities are facing food shortages that are expected to become worse in the coming months. The attenuation of humanitarian relief, in the context of growing food shortages, is sure to translate into hundreds of thousands of deaths. The Sudanese Government is being held responsible for this. It has not only been accused of creating the militias but also of turning a blind eye to their continued killings. It has yet to take basic steps to provide security to the people of Darfur. But its seriousness regarding this is questionable.

Resolving the Crisis: A Distant Dream

Until now the efforts that have been made by the UN and the African Union to resolve the crisis have not borne any fruit. The threats of sanctions that were never imposed for fear of vetoes by China and Russia which have vital economic interests in Sudan, have done little to end the atrocities. China is the single largest investor in the oil industry in Sudan and Russia has interest in selling arms. This volatile mixture of oil and arms has actually prevented the UN from taking any meaningful action against the Khartoum government. The recent resolution secured a unanimous 15-0 Security Council vote only by sidelining the Darfur crisis and emphasising upon north-south peace.

The Security Council is no longer demanding what is essential - to restore security - in Darfur, even as it expresses serious concern at the growing insecurity and violence in the area. Instead of warning the Sudanese Government to stop military attacks and disarm the Janjaweed militia, the Council has only condemned acts of violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties.

The atrocities of the Janjaweed militia and the Khartoum regime have been rendered morally equivalent to those of Darfuri insurgents by the US, UN and other international actors. But the military actions of Darfur insurgents are a response to decades of political and economic marginalisation, as well as the protection accorded by Khartoum to Arab militias that have for years attacked African tribal villages. Creating such moral equivalence, giving factitiously equal responsibility for violence and insecurity, is disingenuous and unjustified. It reflects nothing other than international failure to compel Khartoum to disarm the Janjaweed and provide meaningful protection to vulnerable civilians. It is also counterproductive. By blurring the question of responsibility, it encourages the government to presume that genocide will go unpunished.

The Khartoum government has, indeed, been emboldened by the present UN stance. As the veiled threat of sanctions recedes, the odds that the Sudanese Government will comply with the UN’s demand grow slimmer. Should Sudan be sticking to its deadline of December 31 is also questionable because of its past history of false dawns and, missed deadlines. If Darfur has to wait for the northsouth peace settlement, any resolution to the Darfur crisis remains a distant dream.

Although efforts have been made by the African Union to resolve the crisis, progress has been slow. The AU has not found the will to send troops to Darfur over the objection of the Sudanese Government. Out of the 3,000 troops that were to be sent, only 700 troops have been deployed. But even 3,000 is inadequate to control a vast province the size of France. The peace talks, started in Abuja in August, have largely been stalled. The resumed peace process in December also could not proceed, as the government complained of continued rebel attacks and the rebels pointed to ongoing military attacks by the government and the militia. For meaningful negotiations to take place, violence and insecurity has to be contained. While the African Union lacks the capacity to handle this on its own the international community is content to push it on the AU’s shoulders.

International Community’s Inaction

In the interim, thousands more people are being killed and displaced, and there is no adequate plan or strong commitment from the international community to deal with the crisis. The US-convened Security Council meeting in Nairobi has made it painfully clear that nothing will be done to change the fundamental dynamics of insecurity in Darfur and thus the genocide will continue remorselessly. Resolution 1574 of November 19, 2004, proves beyond reasonable doubt that there will be no actions of consequence to compel Khartoum to halt the genocide in Darfur. The last time a slaughter of such magnitude visited Africa was 10 years ago, when machete wielding Hutus killed some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda. Then also, there were plenty of apologies from the West and at the UN for having done nothing. The tragedy of Rwanda is worth recalling as Darfur heads down a similar destructive path. The global community seems oblivious to the blood that will be shed and the countless lives lost that in many ways dwarfs the ravages of the recent tsunami disaster.

References/End Notes

1. Amnesty International, Press Release, March 15, 2004.
2. “Darfur: UN Backtracks in Sudan Resolution”, Human Rights Watch [Nairobi], November 19,
   2004.
3. Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2004
4. Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, December 3, 2004.
5. Save the Children, Press Release, November 22, 2004.
6. UN Daily Press Review, November 20 and 21, 2004.
7. UN IRIN, March 22, 2004.
8. UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, November 23, 2004.
9. UN Security Council Resolution 1556, July 30, 2004.
10. UN Security Council Resolution 1564, September 30, 2004.
11. UN Security Council Resolution 1574, November 19, 2004.

Introduction

The recent developments in Manipur have once again brought into focus the question of application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA) in Northeast India. On July 11, 2004, the alleged rape and killing of Thanjam Manorama, suspected to be a cadre of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sparked agitations throughout Manipur for the withdrawal of the AFSP Act from Manipur.

Due to the disturbance and insurgency in the state, the Government of India promulgated the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 in Manipur State. Since 1980, the whole of Manipur has been a “disturbed area”1 under the Act. Vide this Act,2 the security forces have been given some extra powers so as to operate against the insurgents in the disturbed areas.

Feeling Among People of Manipur

The 1972 amendments to AFSPA extended the power to declare an area disturbed to the Central Government whereas in the 1958 version of AFSPA, only the state Governor had the power. A section of the Manipuris feel that power should remain only with the state government. They also feel that the Section 3 of the AFSPA does not specify any time limit. The notification in Manipur issued in 1980 still continues even after 24 years, and thereby they feel that they have been deprived of the spirit of liberty, freedom and democracy for too long a period. The exercise by the armed forces of the unchecked powers to arrest, search, seize and even shoot to kill conferred under Section 4 of the Act has resulted in large-scale violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 14,19,21,22 and 25 of the Constitution. The power under the Section 4(a) of AFSP Act3 has hurt the citizens of Manipur the most as they feel that the Act confers the armed forces with broadly defined powers to shoot to kill and that this is a law, which fosters a climate in which the agents of law enforcement are able to use excessive force with impunity.

It is alleged that security forces have destroyed homes and other structures presuming them to be used by insurgents under provisions of Section 4(b) of AFSPA.4 Manipuris also feel that arrests without warrants5 is a serious encroachment on the right to liberty of a person. The power of search and seizure under Section 4(d)6 has been extensively used by the armed forces in cordon and search operations leading to widespread violation of fundamental rights of citizens and the forces have kept arrested persons (Section 5)7 for several days in their custody.

Due to protection under Section 6 of the Act,8 some security force personnel even violated the human rights of people and left the victims without any effective remedy. The failure to identify those responsible for human rights violations and to bring them to justice has meant that some members of the security force continue to believe that they are above law and can violate human rights with impunity. The cases of Naga boys of Oinam village being tortured before their mothers by Assam Rifles jawans in July 1987; the killing of Amine Devi and her child of Bishnupur district on April 5, 1996 by a CRPF party; the abduction, torture and killing of 15- year-old Sanamacha of Angtha village by an Assam Rifles party on 12 February 1998; the shooting dead of 10 civilians by an Assam Rifles party in November 2000 are some of the glaring examples that are still fresh in the minds of Manipuris. Now the case of Manorama has led to a complete collapse of the administration in the state. Apunba Lup, a conglomeration of 32 organisations in Manipur, is spearheading the current stir, which has put the Government of India under tremendous pressure to repeal the AFSP Act. Leaders of Apunba Lup had met the Prime Minister in New Delhi and were assured that the Act would be reviewed.

Why Are Special Powers Essential

Every country dealing with insurgency or with terrorism has its own laws and legislations to tackle the menace. Likewise, India has laws to fight insurgency and terrorism, and has given legal powers to armed forces operating in ‘disturbed’ areas under AFSPA 1958.

The power to declare an area ‘disturbed’ lies with the Governor or the Central Government, who have to form an opinion that the use of armed forces in the aid of civil power is essential and then notify it as ‘disturbed area’. The declaration of an area as a ‘disturbed area’ is for a limited duration and review of the declaration before the expiry of six months has to be undertaken by the executive.

A non-commissioned officer has also been conferred with the powers under the Act because it is he who is the commander of a section and leads it for any operation. While exercising powers under Section 4(a), the armed forces should use minimum force required for effective action. This force is to be used against armed militants.

While executing action under powers conferred under Section 4(b) of the Act during operations against militants, there are chances that a few houses may get damaged where the militants take shelter. Section 4(d) is essential, so as to search out the militants or any other equipment hidden in villages or in residential areas. Innocents are likely to be harassed during cordon and search operations. Though, the security force personnel are protected under Section 6 of the Act, but if they violate the law they are severely punished under the respective laws of Army and the Armed Forces. The powers conferred under the AFSPA have been upheld by the Supreme Court in 1998.9

The people influenced by the militants are concerned about human rights violations by security forces, but what about the violations committed by the militants? As per a police report, during 2000-2004, militants killed more than 450 civilians and kidnapped several senior government officials.

Initially, there were only three militant groups; today, there are at least 26 militant groups operating in the small state. Most of the groups operate under the influence of external directors. There is also the menace of drug trafficking in the state. Overall, the situation in Manipur is alarming and to counter this, the armed forces operating in the state require special powers to support them.

General Effect, if AFSPA is Repealed in Manipur

1. It will cause a chain reaction in all states where the Act has been enforced.
2. No armed force would like to carry out any operation in the insurgent affected areas without proper legal protection for its personnel.
3. It will demoralise the armed forces and all initiative will be lost.
4. Whenever any offensive action is taken by armed forces, the militant groups will instigate the people/local authorities to initiate legal cases against the armed forces. Justice may be biased under the influence of militants.
5. The militants will get an upper hand and may be difficult to contain.
6. Incidents of extortion from the civilian population/government organisations will go unchecked.
7. Civil administration will be overrun by the militants and there will be chaos all around.

Remedial Measures

The general administration in Manipur is not able to give effective justice to the people, with the result that it has to depend on the security forces for its normal functioning. Therefore, the forces operating in the state have to be honest, law abiding and must respect the rights of the people of the state. The commanders at all levels should follow the principle of “use of minimum force” required for effective action. They should brief their men to respect all womenfolk. In case any woman is to be arrested, then it should be done with the help of a lady police/ force personnel, who should also remain present during interrogation. While carrying out search operations, the force personnel should associate a local respected person and also the owner of the house, and after the search, the owner should be permitted to search the search party is he so desires. One must challenge before opening fire and to ensure that one fires only in self-defence. A grievance cell should be opened at Sector Headquarters/ Battalion Headquarters so that the civilians can lodge complaints against the force personnel if they so desire and the commander should take necessary action as deemed fit. Police representatives must be associated with every operation conducted by the security forces.

The training should be of high level so that the armed force may be able to handle all types of situations with professional competence. It is high time that the state police is trained to take over operational responsibilities from the Army and the BSF. The normal operations may be conducted by the state armed police and only major and pinpointed operations be left for the armed forces. Junior level personnel should be properly briefed to not to over react to any sensitive situation.

It is also important to evolve a mechanism to deal/ tackle with overground support structures that are generally well-connected with local politicians and are regarded in the society. Everything depends on intelligence and hence we must sharpen the skills of the armed forces for collection of hard intelligence. Senior commanders should handle civil society sensibly so as to extract sympathy and maximum information from them. This will also help in changing the perception of the local population in the larger interest of the Government/ Nation.

Conclusion

There can be no two options that insurgency has to be put down with a firm hand within the provisions of law and not to be dictated by the militants. You cannot tie both hands of the security forces and then ask them to fight armed militants. The militants will keep on exploiting the sentiments of the local people and they (militants) will try to reap benefits from such situations. Avoid any tendency to carry out blind operations against militants without specific intelligence/information. Indiscriminate arrests and harassment of people out of frustration for not being able to locate the real culprits should be avoided. Security forces should be very careful while operating in the Northeast and must not give any chance to the militants to exploit the situation. All good actions of the force get nullified with one wrong action. Any person, including the supervisory staff, found guilty of violating law should be severely dealt with. The law is not defective, but it is its implementation that has to be managed properly. The local people have to be convinced with proper planning and strategy.

References/End Notes

• 1. If the Governor of a state or the Central Government is of the opinion that an area is in such a disturbed or dangerous state that the use of armed forces in aid of civil power is necessary, then either of them can declare it to be ‘disturbed area’ by notification in the state.
• 2. Notification of ‘disturbed area’.
• 3. Section 4(a) of AFSPA states that if in his opinion, it is necessary for maintenance for public order to fire even to the extent of causing death or otherwise use force against a person who is acting in contravention of an order prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or of ‘things capable of being used as weapons’
• 4. Section 4(b) states that if in his opinion, it is necessary to do so, then to destroy any arms dump or fortified position, any shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be made, and any structure used as training camp for armed volunteers or as a hide out for armed gangs or absconders.
• 5. Section 4(c) states that arrest without warrant any person who has committed a cognisable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed or is likely to commit a cognisable offence and to use whatever force is necessary to affect the arrest.
• 6. Section 4(d) states that to enter and search without warrant any premises to make an arrest or to recover any person wrongfully confined or to recover any arms, ammunition, explosive substances or suspected stolen property
• 7. Section 5 makes it mandatory for the Army to hand over a person arrested under the Act to the nearest police station with least possible delay.
• 8. Section 6 lays down that prosecution; suit or other legal proceeding can be instituted against a person acting under the Act, only after getting previous sanction of the Central Government.
• 9. Article “An Illusion of Justice (Supreme Court Judgement on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act)” http://education.vsnl.com/pudr/illusion.html

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), present a serious danger to humanity. These weapons, once recognised as tools of deterrence available to State actors, are now even feared as the weapons of choice for non-State actors. During the last few decades, the perceived threats from WMDs has become a significant issue in the foreign policy and national security agendas for many nation-States.

In the recent past, the WMD threat profoundly influenced the Bush administration’s national security policies and shaped their foreign policy dogma. The invasion of Iraq (2003) challenged the concept of sovereignty and even identified the perceived proliferation of WMDs as a rightful reason for toppling a regime. At the same time, the absence of WMDs in Iraq had such an impact that many analysts started rating the WMD threat as an ‘overstated threat’. However, the Iran, DPRK, South Korea and Taiwan exposé made people aware that the threat is far from over and existing non-proliferation policies of the international system are not sufficient to cap this threat.

Under this backdrop, a detailed description of existing WMD realities and the various international initiatives undertaken to tackle this threat by six experts in the book titled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Options for India is a most timely publication. The book goes beyond the descriptive level and provides a critique on various types of WMDs and its likely impact on civil society. Also, it evaluates the actual threat of WMDs and the likely scenarios that India needs to guard against. It carries out a threat assessment in the Indian context and most importantly provides a set of politico-military-administrative recommendations to tackle this threat.

The editor of this book, Rear Admiral (Retd) Raja Menon, has brought together a group of experts who have considerable experience in fields like the armed forces, diplomacy and academia, and have dealt with these issues directly or indirectly in some capacity in the past. Their background has helped them in corroborating their practical experience towards the evaluation of the subject in a more focused manner. The result is a book of uniformly high quality.

The book is divided into five parts, with each part dealing with different themes. Part I, titled Theory of Effectiveness, has three chapters dealing with nuclear, chemical and biological dimensions. Part II carries out a nuclear threat assessment in respect of India. Part III presents the current international non-proliferation regime scenario in respect of WMDs. Part IV and V evaluates India’s negotiating positions and formulates India’s options.

The book is richer in content on nuclear issues than on biological and chemical issues. But this is understandable, because amongst all WMDs it is nuclear weapons that are perceived to be the most dangerous. The global community is more concerned about these weapons because only five States are allowed to possess them under the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and three others possess them outside the NPT framework. The same is not the case with either biological or chemical weapons and their possession is illegal under the biological and toxic weapons convention (BTWC) and chemical weapons convention (CWC), respectively.

Nuclear issues are mainly dealt by Prof. Matin Zuberi, who has long experience of studying these issues. His contribution is excellent in its diagnosis and analysis of the limitations and ills of NPT. He explores the entire history of NPT and successfully articulates the logic of inequality embedded in it. He makes an interesting point about Homi Bhaba’s vision, when he had predicted that verification efforts would be biased against developing countries, something that has now turned out to be a reality. He further mentions that Dr. Bhaba had foreseen the possibility of what happened in Iraq: the pursuit of nuclear weapon efforts in parallel with peaceful programmes under safeguards.

In the section explaining the reasons behind South Africa dismantling their nuclear programme, the author refrains from mentioning the racial angle behind this endgame. In another important chapter, titled The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis, the author analyses in detail the impact of the disintegration of the erstwhile USSR on the NPT. This chapter also gives a brief account of Pakistan and China’s stated and unstated positions on NPT. The author also explores the problem of deterring ‘rogue’ states. The analysis on Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the A. Q. Khan network will attract reader attention, given their dominance in the current strategic discourse.

The book contains two more chapters on nuclear issues by different authors. These chapters essentially put the nuclear threat in perspective in the Indian context. A major drawback of these and a few other chapters is that the analysis is based on mainly western sources. Probably, the authors cannot be blamed, since few nonwestern works in these areas are available. However, the lethality assessments (number of casualties expected from WMD attacks), which are essentially based on 1970s and 1980s sources, need to be carried out again given the valuable information technology tools and mathematical modeling techniques that are now available. Certain other areas where one can disagree are the sections dealing with nuclear terrorist threats. The scenarios like a truck bomb ramming into a nuclear plant are ridiculed by many safety analysts, who feel that the layered custom-made structures of nuclear plants would be very difficult to crack. Also, there is some repetition in Chapters 1 and 4.

Six chapters in the book are devoted towards an analysis of chemical and biological weapons threat. These chapters lucidly cover the nature of threat, the current status of chemical and biological weapons regimes, and provide a discourse on how India looks at them today and how it should do so in the future.

These chapters contribute much towards the understanding of the entire chemical and biological weapons scenario, and give the reader a comprehensive view on the subject, something that has been missing in many recent works on these subjects. However, like other contemporary publications, the book suffers from the same lacuna when it comes to describing various chemical and biological agents. For the average reader, the information detailing characteristics of chemical and biological agents make little sense while for an informed reader this information is irrelevant. Readers are generally aware of the dangers of chemical and biological weapons, and any agent-wise description generally gives a feeling of reading a school/college level textbook.

The chapter on protection against biological and toxin warfare successfully knits a complex web of understanding the ‘health fraternity’ in the Indian system and gives a comprehensive set of recommendations to tackle this threat at the governmentlevel (both Central and state). However, this chapter could have merited an observation on the network of NGOs, as this could be handy for tackling chem-bio disaster management. In the Indian context along with bio terrorism, agro terrorism is also a perceived threat and an analysis of this threat could have enriched this chapter further.

The book gives a fascinating account of the ‘WMD market’ at Nawashahr, Pakistan. This two-page description puts the entire threat of WMD terrorism in the correct perspective. The chapter on trends in CWC and BTWC provides an interesting debate on related arms control regimes and their future and furnishes an Indiacentric formulation that can help India to serve its security interests. Particularly in case of biological weapons, openness, transparency and an attitudinal change among State parties can help build a global effort towards threat reduction. However, the United States’ reluctance in this area is indicative of the fact that BTWC may not become relevant in days to come.

It may be added that the book could have become richer if some more attention could have been given towards its overall format. While the book has an introduction, there is no separate conclusion, leaving the reader with a feeling of an abrupt end. While each chapter concludes with a set of recommendations, a chapter giving the overall picture of the threat and India’s options in totality could have helped contextualise the rigorous analysis carried out in the book. Also, the introduction fails to provide a holistic view about the nature of the threat, what needs to be done, the limitations and compulsions of States towards an arms control regime and instead digresses more towards only biological threats and BTWC. In the introduction, the entire concept behind this project and the aim behind giving ‘policy’ recommendations could have been better explained (on page 247, there is brief reference that this study was undertaken for studying the implications of chemical and biological weapons).

The book talks of only defensive measures to tackle the WMD threat. No mention is made about the need for developing technologies like Agent Defeat Weapons (ADW) that are capable of physically destroying such weapons at the weapon sites. Also, the book, which is essentially devoted to disarmament regimes, could have done some crystal gazing regarding the likely fallouts of the NPT and BTWC, which are due for review in 2005 and 2006, respectively.

Overall, this edited volume provides a comprehensive view of the current global WMD scenario and options for India thereof. The contributors need to be complimented for doing a painstaking work in meshing various disarmament regimes, WMD terrorism threats, safety and security aspects, and suggesting a national strategy to counter this threat.

Unlike other aspects of non-traditional security, energy security has been very closely linked with military security. Very often, it is the powerful state-consumers seeking to preserve an uninterrupted supply of energy at an affordable price, who threaten and use military force. At times, it is individuals and groups within the energy-producing countries seeking to resist energy-driven foreign interventions, who disrupt the supplies. The energy-military security nexus is at its peak in the present circ*mstances - mainly in Iraq, but also in the energy-rich West Asia. The paper proposes to examine the global security/insecurity of energy and its likely implications for India. Without giving up diversification and self-reliance as options, we need to accept the fact that West Asia would remain the source of an overwhelming proportion of India’s oil and gas imports. India’s energy policy, in the circ*mstances, will have to proceed from this basic given.